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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores coopetition, a strategy that combines cooperation and competition in 
addressing relationships between firms. We examine the underlying nature of coopetition, and 
evaluate the extent to which it represents a relevant strategy for small firms. Inherent 
problems are identified when attempting to collaborate with competitors. We propose an 
approach to measuring the coopetitive tendencies of small .firms. The measurement approach 
centers on three underlying dimensions: mutual benefit, trust, and commitment. Applying this 
approach, we assess the relationship between coopetition and firm performance. Based on a 
survey of 647 small .firms in Turkey, a strong, positive relationship is identified Theoretical 
and managerial implications are drawn from the .findings. 
INTRODUCTION 
Having a superior product or resource 
advantage is often not enough to ensure the 
sustainability of emerging ventures (Sherer, 
2003). For these firms, their ability to 
compete may be tied to their ability to 
cooperate. This seemingly paradoxical 
statement reflects the complex nature of the 
competitive environment facing 
entrepreneurial organizations. Turbulent 
external conditions exacerbate the liabilities 
of newness and smallness that affiict small, 
emerging firms (Laine, 2002). Dynamic, 
hostile, and complex environmental 
conditions also result in an increased 
emphasis on innovation as a source of 
competitive advantage. Yet, the high expense 
and risk associated with innovation can be 
especially problematic for smaller firms 
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operating with limited resources and that are 
especially vulnerable to environmental 
discontinuities (Parker, 2000). 
In these circumstances, collaborative 
relationships with competitors may represent 
a viable strategy. Parker (2000) notes that 
firms experiencing high rates of 
technological and other environmental 
change, and firms confronting greater 
product variety in the market, are especially 
likely to pursue cooperative relationships. A 
number of researchers cite competitive 
intensity itself as a major factor driving firms 
to pursue a strategy of cooperation (BarNir 
and Smith, 2002). Collaboration is a means 
of leveraging resources, and can be a useful 
method for protecting a firm's market 
position (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Kanter 
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(1994) suggests that cooperative 
relationships represent a type of corporate 
asset that can produce "collaborative 
advantage". 
As strategic factors affecting a firm's market 
position, cooperation and competition have 
historically been approached independently 
by researchers. However, pursuing both 
strategies simultaneously has been the focus 
of a number of recent studies (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000; Garcia and Velasco, 2002; 
Gnyawali and Madhavan, 200 l; Luo, 2005). 
When a firm is engaged in both competition 
and cooperation in a given relationship, the 
behavior is termed "coopetition." The 
purpose of the current study is to explore the 
phenomenon of coopetition in a small 
business context. Attention is devoted to 
establishing the nature of coopetition and 
identifying factors that affect a firm's 
tendency to cooperate with a direct 
competitor. The unique nature of coopetiti~n 
when pursued by small ventures is 
investigated. Based on the literature, a 
theoretical model of coopetition is developed 
that centers on three core dimensions: mutual 
benefit, trust, and commitment. 
Conceptualized in this manner, it is posited 
that coopetition should affect company 
performance. The model is tested using a 
cross-sectional sample of Turkish firms. 
Implications are drawn for theory and 
practice. 
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: 
COO PETITION 
Coopetition occurs when two firms 
cooperate in some business activities while 
simultaneously competing with one another 
(Luo, 2005). Hence, elements of both 
cooperation and competition are present. 
Laine (2002) explains that coopetition means 
that two firms might cooperate by 
coordinating their purchasing and service 
provision operations at the same t~e that 
they are competing in the manufactunng and 
marketing areas. Bengtsson and Kock (20?0) 
discuss collaboration between competmg 
firms operating in different product 
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categories. These perspectives could lead 
one to conclude that coopetition is a simple 
mix of both cooperation and competition. 
However, Dagnino and Padula (2002) argue 
that coopetition involves the merging of 
cooperation and competition to form a new 
kind of strategic relationship between firms. 
What they term the 'coopetitive system of 
value creation' is consistent with Kanter's 
(1994) position that cooperation lea~ to 
competitive advantage when the focus is on 
new value creation. 
Degrees of cooperation and competition are 
possible in a given coopetitive relationship. 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) describe three 
types of relationships based on the weight 
given to each behavior: cooperation-
dominated, competition-dominated, and 
equal relationships. Dennis (2000). In 
discussing networked relationships, they 
distinguish dominated networks and equal-
partner networks. The side of th~ coo~titive 
relationship that is more heavily weighted 
can be influenced by the nature of the 
activities performed by the firms. For 
instance, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) found 
that when activities performed by two firms 
in a relationship have greater distance from 
buyers, the firms tend to cooperate more 
frequently. When activities are closer to 
buyers, such as customer service activities, 
they tend to compete more intensely. This 
phenomenon also appears to be tied to 
resource heterogeneity. Where each firm has 
unique resources not held by the other, and 
each firm perceives that sharing the 
resources does not undermine its own 
competitive position, cooperation will be 
stronger. 
Coopetition entails both benefits and costs to 
the participating firms. In terms of benefits, 
Garcia and Velasco (2002) found that 
cooperation with competitors has a positive 
effect on performance of particular business 
activities, coordination of product lines, and 
technological diversity. Spence, Coles, and 
Harris (200 I) discuss the ability to gain 
access to external knowledge sources, while 
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Bengtsson and Kock (2000) found that 
coopetition can serve as a mechanism for 
organizational learning, especially as it 
relates to core competencies of competitors. 
Other observers emphasize cost sharing, 
shorter lead times, more stable supply 
sources, access to scientific resources, and 
opportunities for scale economies as direct 
benefits (Dowling & Roering, 1996). 
Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) use 
the case of joint manufacturing to 
demonstrate cost savings from coopetition. 
Parker (2000) illustrates how collaboration 
enables firms to respond better to customers. 
From a more strategic vantage point, 
cooperation with competitors can enhance 
company flexibility and give the firm more 
control over market uncertainties (Borch & 
Arthur, 1995; Dennis, 2000). Gummesson 
(1997) suggests that sufficient levels of 
competition keep managers alert, while 
sufficient levels of collaboration make them 
feel secure. Garcia and Velasco (2002) argue 
that organizational benefits derive from the 
'creative tension' that is fostered by 
coopetition. Competition ensures the 
relationship remains dynamic by forcing 
both sides to innovate and improve, and by 
driving out inefficient firms, ineffective 
relationships, and old technologies. Firms 
cooperate to be more effective by achieving 
synergy and they compete to realize the 
advantages of this synergy (Zineldin, 1998). 
Coopetition also involves costs to the parties. 
Parker (2000) notes that being in a 
relationship can cause additional financial 
and time costs that offset the gains from the 
relationship. Being in a relationship can also 
cause firms to experience a loss of control 
over key activities or resources, including 
control over proprietary information 
(Hakansson & Ford, 2002). Firms are 
especially vulnerable when partners become 
less committed to the cooperative side of the 
relationship or focus only on their own 
benefits (Amaldoss, Meyer, & Rapoport 
(2000). 
Some researchers conclude that cooperation 
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between competitors can hinder or delay the 
innovation process and slow investments in 
new technologies (Amaldoss et al., 2000; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Jorde & Teece, 
1989). Others suggest that rivalry and 
conflict between firms can hamper each 
company's performance when they attempt 
to collaborate. For instance, Robson and 
Bennet (2000) argue that collaboration in a 
horizontal relationship has no positive 
influence on firm performance. They suggest 
that many collaborative relationships 
actually have negative outcomes including 
reductions in sales, profits, and numbers of 
employees. Alternatively, Gulati (1998) 
finds that higher performance can result 
when such collaboration creates new 
opportunities for the partnering firms. 
Apart from these costs, coopetition poses 
unique challenges for each partner. Firms 
must develop the managerial skills and 
capabilities necessary for mastering 
simultaneous competition and cooperation 
with another firm. Particular challenges exist 
in overcoming the differences between firms 
and protecting joint investments and trade 
secrets (Zineldin, 1998). Further, parameters 
must be established regarding areas in which 
information is shared. Dependencies 
between firms in a relationship can also 
cause problems when developing and 
implementing marketing strategies for the 
firms individually (Wilkinson & Young, 
2002). Even though they act together in 
many ways, the actors in the relationship 
also aim to reach their own objectives, so the 
firms face difficulties in setting the 
appropriate strategies without undermining 
the competitor's overall objectives. 
A key managerial challenge involves 
maintaining the relative balance in levels of 
cooperation and competition with another 
firm. Maintenance of the relative balance can 
play a key role in determining firm 
performance (Garcia & Velasco,2002). 
Cooperation results in a certain level of 
dependency on the partner. Where scarce 
resources are being shared, the providing 
firm for a given resource must make ongoing 
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decisions regarding how much to invest in 
maintaining and upgrading the resource. The 
receiving firm may have an incentive to 
reduce their dependence over time and 
achieve more control (Luo, 2005). At the 
same time, the competitive side of the 
relationship is a critical incentive for internal 
efficiencies and ongoing innovation. 
Management must be vigilant in determining 
the extent to which coopetition adversely 
impacts company efficiency and the 
productivity of innovation efforts (Tsai, 
2002). 
Coopetition arguably should enhance each 
partner's strategic pos1t1on in the 
marketplace. Each firm continues to manage 
its ongoing strategic position while 
cooperating with a given competitor. Yet, 
these strategic positions are dynamic, and are 
driven by the firm's evolving strengths and 
weaknesses. Moreover, new marketplace 
opportunities are continually becoming 
available to a given firm. Strategies become 
subject to modification, leading to changes in 
resource allocation decisions. Over time, the 
incentive to invest more in cooperating or 
competing with a given firm will change 
(BarNir & Smith, 2002). 
Coopetition and the Emerging Enterprise 
Research on coopetition has focused 
primarily on larger and/or multinational 
companies (Dagnino & Padula, 2002; 
Dussauge et al.,2000; Kanter, 1994). For 
their part, it would seem that emerging firms 
confront a distinct set of circumstances that 
affect the logic of pursuing a coopetitive 
strategy. 
Compared to their medium- and large-sized 
counterparts, smaller ventures are more 
vulnerable to environmental forces, 
especially given the limited cash reserves 
and debt capacity of such organizations, their 
frequent over-dependence on a limited 
product/service line, and their tendency to 
rely on a niche customer base. These firms 
frequently suffer from a relatively limited 
market presence, subjecting them to 
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significant demand fluctuations, aggressive 
competitor forays, and lack of support from 
suppliers and distributors. Aldrich and 
Auster (1986) discuss the 'liability of 
smallness' in terms of problems in raising 
capital, fewer tax advantages, and 
proportionately greater costs from regulation 
compared to larger firms. Moreover, 
especially at the early stages of the venture, 
entrepreneurs are unfamiliar with their roles 
and the roles of the firm, and are apt to 
commit a variety of errors and blunders. This 
phenomenon has been characterized as the 
'liability of newness'. 
These circumstances would seem to suggest 
a strong incentive for coopetition within 
these firms. Coopetition offers potential 
resources to the severely resource-
constrained firm, and represents a vehicle for 
entering markets the firm is otherwise unable 
to enter. Separately, while technological 
advantages can enable a small firm to 
compete in major markets dominated by 
larger players, limited resources and 
capabilities prevent small firms from 
research and development activities that 
result in major innovations (Afuah, 2000; 
Verhees & Meulenberg, 2004). Relationships 
with competitors can allow the firm to 
develop or use technologies it otherwise 
could not develop on its own. In addition, 
relationships offer potential scale economies 
for the small venture, as firms benefit from 
joint volume opportunities (Gomes-Casseres, 
1997; Volery, 1995). Scale economies 
achieved in this manner allow small firms to 
lower their costs, reduce capital 
expenditures, and achieve a larger market 
presence. Moreover, cooperation allows for 
organizational learning in key areas where 
the firm is under-developed and under-
resourced. 
It can also be argued that small firms should 
find cooperation with competitors relatively 
easy. Their fixed commitments are often 
limited, operations are less constrained by 
structure, controls, and formal policies, 
image and market positioning are not well-
established in the minds of key publics, and 
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external networks are not well-defined or 
solidified. Bird (1989) notes that they can 
innovate more quickly, are typically less 
concerned with retained earnings or payout 
of profits, have employees with less vested 
interest in how things are done or resources 
are allocated, and their managers and 
employees experience more role ambiguity. 
Woo, et al. (1990) found evidence of 
entrepreneurs more readily willing to 
experiment with different competitive 
options than to refocus decisions related to 
the scope of the enterprise. 
Conversely, while flexibility tends to be a 
strategic advantage, small firms can also 
develop "organizational inertia." Woo, et al. 
(1992) report evidence that inertia can limit 
the strategic flexibility of small firms as a 
function of changes in organization size, 
prior experience of the entrepreneur with 
similar products, and ownership and age of 
the venture. However, they also found a 
dynamic environment would offset this 
inertia. 
At the same time, small firms may have less 
to bring to a coopetition-based relationship. 
Their core competencies are in the 
developmental stage, and learning in these 
organizations is not likely to be as well-
organized or systematic as in larger 
companies. Separately, coopetition requires 
attention and investments that can distract 
entrepreneurs from critical growth and 
development demands within their ventures. 
Also, requisite skills in selecting appropriate 
firms with which to cooperate, and in 
formulating a workable relationship 
agreement may be limited in small firms. 
Yet, errors in these areas can have a 
devastating impact on these firms. 
Ongoing market changes have a notably 
strong effect on early stage firms, especially 
those with poor planning skills, insufficient 
financial resources, and managers having 
limited professional experience (Premaratne, 
2001). An interesting paradox arises. On the 
one hand, coopetition may better enable the 
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firm to adapt to changing market conditions 
(Hakansson & Ford, 2002). On the other 
hand, changing market conditions serve to 
modify the relative costs and benefits of a 
coopetition-based strategy, and the smaller 
firm may be less adept at deciphering these 
changes, estimating the evolving costs and 
benefits, and making the necessary 
adjustments to the coopetition-based 
relationship. 
Dimensions of Coopetition 
Conceptual work on coopetition has tended 
to treat the competitive and cooperative 
dimensions independently. An example can 
be found in the work of Luo (2005), whose 
sub-dimensions of cooperation included 
strategic interdependence, subunit form, and 
technological linkage, while sub-dimensions 
of competition included local 
responsiveness, market overlap, and 
capability retrogression. Yet, the decision to 
cooperate with competitors does not involve 
two separate behaviors, but instead requires a 
set of ongoing actions that are intricately 
interwoven. The nature of how the firm 
competes becomes defined by how it 
cooperates, and vice versa. As such, it is our 
contention that these dimensions must be 
considered simultaneously. 
More specifically, competition with another 
firm within one's industry represents the 
status quo. The decision to cooperate with 
this firm while continuing to compete with 
them thus entails a departure from 
conventional practice as well as from the 
conventional managerial orientation or 
mindset. Our ability to properly 
conceptualize coopetition requires that we 
approach the cooperative behavior within the 
context of the competitive behavior. 
We propose that three key dimensions 
underlie the formation of a synergistic 
relationship with a competitor: mutual 
benefit, trust, and commitment. There is a 
duality to each of these dimensions. Each is 
defined not simply by the interaction 
between two parties, but by the competitive 
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context. Hence, one firm trusts the other to 
meet the requirements of collaboration or 
sharing, but also not to undermine the ability 
to compete. Levels of commitment are made 
that reflect an investment in the competitor 
while not undermining the firm's own 
competitive needs and capabilities. 
Similarly, mutual benefits are ultimately the 
result of how the relationship impacts each 
firm's ability to compete. Let us explore 
each of these dimensions in more detail. 
Mutual Benefit 
Work on dyadic relationships tends to 
highlight the importance of trust and 
commitment (e.g., Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
Relationships are pursued to the extent that 
they are instrumental in achieving utility for 
the firm. Accordingly, a dyadic relationship 
must benefit both parties in organizationally 
meaningful ways, even if the benefit is not 
equal for both parties (Adler, 1967). 
Svensson (2002) stresses the importance of 
mutual benefit m his work on the 
measurement of mutual dependence between 
partners in a relationship. It is our contention 
that, without mutual benefit, the dimensions 
of trust and commitment cannot adequately 
capture a coopetitive relationship. 
Benefits can derive both from competition 
and cooperation. The difference is that the 
competitive side of the relationship does not 
require a mutuality of benefit, while the 
cooperative side cannot occur without 
mutual benefit. This distinction is based on 
the fact that the competitive side of a 
coopetitive relationship involves conflicting 
interests, while the cooperative side involves 
compatible interests (Bengtsson et al., 2003). 
A firm participating in a cooperative 
relationship with its competitor will have the 
advantages of pooling resources and 
capabilities to compete effectively with the 
other competitors in the market (Amaldoss et 
al., 2000; Hakansson & Ford, 2002). 
Dowling and Roering ( 1996) argue that 
altering the flow and pooling of unique 
resources is the main reason for coopetition. 
Wilkinson and Young (2002) suggest 
cooperation is a strategy for resource 
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acquisition while competition is a strategy 
for marketplace advantage. 
It has been suggested that the degree of 
distance between competitors determines the 
structure of their relationship (Bengtsson & 
Kock, 2000). Structure is also affected by 
the power each party has over the other, and 
the corresponding dependency of each party 
on the other (Garcia & Velasco, 2002). 
Relationship structure, in turn, affects the 
motivation to identify and act upon 
opportunities for shared interests. Bengtsson 
et al. (2003) identify four relationship 
structures among firms: competition, 
coexistence, cooperation, and coopetition. 
The level and importance of mutual benefit 
will differ among these different structural 
forms, with both arguably being greatest in a 
purely cooperative relationship. In a 
coopetitive relationship, both will be 
significant, but determination of benefit 
levels is typically more complex. These 
benefit levels can also be expected to vary 
within the coopetitive relationship depending 
on the relative balance in terms of 
cooperation and competition. 
The dynamics of the relationship are also 
affected by firm size. Rivalry is often more 
intensive among firms equal in size and 
where the firms in a relationship perform 
similar functions (Gomes-Casseres, 1997). 
Size affects bargaining power and mutual 
expectation levels in the relationship. 
Whether due to size or other factors, the 
greater the competitive rivalry between 
firms, the less will be the opportunity for 
mutual benefit. This reality is again because 
the competitive and cooperative dimensions 
of coopetition are not independent. As 
mutual benefits are increased, it is likely that 
cooperation lessens the competition between 
two firms. Hence, Bengtsson and Kock 
(2000) find that competition between firms 
within a strategic group is less intensive than 
between the firms that are not in a 
relationship, as competition undermines 
mutual benefit in the former case. 
The structure of the relationship between two 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Journal of Small Business Strategy 
firms determines the purpose and nature of 
the mutual benefits accruing to the partners, 
suggesting that each firm's perception of 
mutual benefit differs based on this structure 
(Garcia & Velasco, 2002). With a 
cooperation-dominated relationship, the 
common goal would be more important than 
each firm's short-term profit maximization. 
In a competition-dominated relationship, 
firms will act to achieve more advantage 
than the other firm. In the main, success in a 
coopetitive relationship finds the advantages 
resulting from both competitive conflict and 
the investments required to build and sustain 
the relationship are outweighed by the 
mutual benefit received by each party. 
Trust 
The critical importance of trust in successful 
relationships, and especially longer-term 
relationships, is well-established in the 
literature (Farrelly & Quester, 2003; 
Sargeant & Lee, 2004). Trust is the basis for 
mutual confidence between firms. Available 
studies focus principally on trust in vertical 
relationships between firms and their 
suppliers, distributors, or customers. From a 
coopetitive perspective, the concern is with 
horizontal relationships, where the concept 
of trust is less understood and often more 
complex. In a traditional competitive 
relationship, some level of trust typically 
exists, albeit relatively low. Firms may trust 
one another to not engage in certain 
practices, such as charging artificially low 
prices, or behaving unethically. In general, 
the companies within a given industry have 
certain common interests, and members of 
the industry are trusted by their peers not to 
undermine the industry welfare. 
Coopetition produces a unique context for 
trust, in that a firm must trust its partner in 
two quite different arenas. According to 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000), cooperation and 
competition represent harmony and conflict 
between firms. The levels of harmony and 
conflict are quite different in horizontal, 
compared to vertical, relationships, and have 
to be managed differently. With coopetition, 
a partner develops trust regarding how the 
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other firm will share resources, 
communicate, meet deadlines, use 
information, and other aspects of the 
cooperative dimension of the relationship. 
At the same time, they must trust the partner 
to not engage in competitive actions that 
significantly undermine their own market 
position. Trust is especially relevant in terms 
of a firm's convictions regarding how the 
partner will balance self-interest against 
mutual interest. 
Relationship-based trust has been associated 
with a number of factors. Sherer (2003) 
found honesty and reliability were especially 
important determinants of trust. Jap (2001) 
emphasized common expectations regarding 
how the benefits of the relationship are 
shared. Parker (2000) demonstrated that 
communication and timely disclosure of 
information between firms are significant 
contributors. Requisite levels of trust also 
tend to be associated with the degree of 
participation in a relationship (Gnyawali & 
Madhavan, 2001 ). Levels of participation, in 
tum, are influenced in part by the relative 
power and dependency of each party vis-a-
vis the other (Premaratne, 2001 ). At the same 
time, high dependency can lead to more 
participation, even where trust is relatively 
low. Alternatively, high levels of trust can 
lead one to participate more, and potentially 
become more dependent in the process. 
The challenge of trust can be especially 
problematic in early-stage ventures where 
firms are still learning how to compete. 
Given their limited resources and more 
tenuous market position, early stage ventures 
are more vulnerable to the adverse actions of 
another economic player. Especially for the 
embattled start-up firm, learning to trust a 
company that may have both the incentive 
and ability to put one out of business places 
requires considerable judgment and insight 
on the part of the entrepreneur. 
Commitment 
Commitment is defined as the desire to 
maintain a valued relationship through 
ongoing investments (Sargeant & Lee, 
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2004). This desire includes a willingness and 
ability to make both financial and non-
financial investments. Garaffo (2002) 
examines commitment levels in coopetitive 
relationships built around exchanges of 
existing knowledge, cooperative research 
and development activities, alliances for 
setting new standards, and collaborative 
agreements to integrate existing businesses. 
He notes the difficulties in estimating the 
real costs of different forms of commitment. 
Commitment entails a process of mutual 
adaptation, as two parties adjust their 
expectations, communication approaches, 
operations, internal processes, and/or 
approaches to resource allocation to reflect 
one another's needs, characteristics, and 
requirements. This kind of adaptation results 
from organizational learning and ongoing 
knowledge development. Sherer (2003) 
stresses the importance of CEO support and 
dedication, and especially willingness to 
learn and share, as aspects of commitment. 
The degree of each firm's commitment 
determines relationship viability over time. 
Commitment levels have been linked to 
benefit sharing. Amaldoss et al. (2000) 
demonstrate that, when partners share the 
benefits equally, commitment increases more 
rapidly. Yet, partners in a coopetitive 
relationship may have an incentive to under-
commit given their mixed motives. They 
commit at a level that detracts from the 
potential mutual benefits because of the 
perceived implications for the firm's own 
benefit or self-interest (e.g., Jorde and Teece, 
1989). Further, because each firms' efforts in 
the relationship affects the success of the 
partner's business, the implications ofunder-
commitment become more severe (Sherer, 
2003). Hence, it has been proposed that 
firms pursue deliberate strategies that reduce 
the risk oflow commitment (Amaldoss et al., 
2000). 
Additional insights on commitment can be 
found in the work by Dussauge et al., (2000), 
who explore two types of alliances, scale and 
link, within a coopetitive relationship. The 
two differ in terms of resource contributions 
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made to the alliance. Scale alliances find 
partners contributing similar resources, while 
link alliances involve partners contributing 
different resource types. The relevance of 
each reflects the purposes of each partner. 
Hence, the entrepreneur seeking greater 
operating efficiencies might be more 
committed to a scale alliance, while one 
attempting to combine complementary 
resources, in order to expand business 
activities seeks a link alliance. Firms tend to 
commit to scale alliances when the focus is 
research and development or production 
resources, while link alliances are especially 
relevant for marketing resources. 
Interaction Among the Dimensions 
Trust is a primary determinant of 
commitment levels (Sargeant & Lee, 2004). 
Both trust and commitment develop over 
time, such that understanding either of them 
requires a temporal perspective. Each will 
influence the other as they evolve, with the 
interactive effect of both contributing to 
relationship success (Morgan & Hunt, 1994 ). 
When partners trust each other and have high 
levels of commitment, it is easier for them to 
adapt to the exigencies of the relationship, 
making the necessary operational changes 
that generate returns over time. The partners 
are more likely to share critical information 
and relevant experiences with each other. 
Perceived risk levels are lowered and a 
greater sense of security in using partner 
resources emerges. 
Mutual benefit also influences relationship 
commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Firms 
will commit to more involved relationships 
when they have opportunities for greater 
benefits, such as lower costs, improved 
productivity, wider distribution, higher 
customer satisfaction, and better product 
performance. Similarly, trust has a positive 
effect on mutual benefit, which in turn 
affects relationship success. Trust is 
important in shaping the behaviors and 
intentions of the firm, in that it affects how 
the firm interprets the behaviors and 
intentions of its partner (Zabkar & Brencic, 
2004). When strong, trust reinforces the 
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firm's belief that the other party is concerned 
for the best interest of the relationship, 
thereby lessening conflict over investment 
levels and benefit sharing. 
Coopetition and Performance 
Do small firms that engage in coopetitive 
strategies perform better? Do stronger 
coopetitive tendencies result in larger 
performance gains than weaker coopetitive 
tendencies? Cursory evidence exists to 
suggest coopetition should have performance 
implications, although it may depend on the 
measure of performance being employed. 
Small businesses use a variety of measures to 
determine business performance. While 
profit is the most heavily emphasized 
performance indicator (Yusuf & Saffu, 
2005), others argue for the importance of 
both financial and non-financial (e.g., 
innovativeness, competitive position) 
indicators (Jarvis et al., 2000). 
Combs and Ketchen (1999) use profit as an 
indicator of performance in a study of inter-
firm cooperation. These authors demonstrate 
that inter-firm relationships (among non-
competing firms) provide opportunities for 
firms to reduce costs or demand price 
premiums, resulting in superior profits for all 
parties. Ploetner and Ehret (2006) link inter-
firm cooperation to rates of sales growth. 
Arguably, coopetition affects structural 
arrangements within a firm, particularly 
firms with limited scope and scale. Using 
sales volume growth, profitability, and 
innovativeness as performance indicators, 
Meijaard et al. (2005) provide evidence of a 
relationship between organizational structure 
and small firm performance. 
Competitive position is another important 
performance indicator. Competition in the 
marketplace is a significant determinant of 
the activities emphasized within firms to 
achieve acceptable performance levels. 
Garcia and Velasco (2002) consider 
coopetition as a way firms can gain 
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competitive advantage. They argue that 
competitive positions of the participating 
firms will be enhanced depending on the 
degree of coopetition (see also Dagnino and 
Padula, 2002). Dussauge et al., (2000) 
discuss strengthening one's own competitive 
position by leveraging the resources of 
another firm. 
Yet, there are reasons to think that 
coopetition can undermine the performance 
of one or both parties to the relationship. 
Small firms can find that the cost of the 
relationship exceeds any future benefit, 
detracting from profits and undermining their 
competitive position in the marketplace 
(Garcia & Velasco, 2002). Further, the 
coopetitive relationship may offer certain 
strategic advantages that do not directly 
translate into financial benefits, even while 
the relationship entails real costs that may 
not be affordable given the firm's limited 
financial resources. Further, as noted earlier, 
performance benefits occur based on both 
parties meeting their obligations to the 
relationship. Common goals are more 
important than a single partner's profit 
maximization. Under-commitment by one of 
the parties will lessen performance of both 
parties, but especially the party with the 
greater commitment level. Similarly, a 
disproportionately skewed or inequitable 
distribution of benefits between the parties 
might find the disadvantaged firm 
performing at levels below what might have 
been expected absent the cooperative 
relationship. 
THE STUDY 
Limited empirical work has been done on 
coopetition and its performance implications, 
particularly within small firms. Yet, it is 
possible to build upon the various studies 
that have focused individually on 
cooperation and competition between 
organizations, as well as the research 
assessing factors that influence the formation 
and management of relationships between 
firms (e.g., Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; 
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Hooley & Fahy, 2002; Sherer, 2003). 
Toward this end, cross-sectional survey 
research was undertaken with a large sample 
of owners of small firms in Turkey. 
A member of the G20, a consortium of the 
world's industrialized countries, Turkey is 
one of the most promising of the emerging 
nations. Following the implementation of 
aggressive, market-based reforms over the 
past twenty years, Turkey is among the 
fastest growing economies in the world. The 
country has opened up its markets by 
reducing government controls on foreign 
trade and investment, privatizing publicly-
owned industries, and liberalizing many 
sectors to private participation. Its economy 
is now dominated by a dynamic industrial 
complex in the major cities, along with a 
developed services sector. The country has 
high literacy rates, a per capita gross national 
income that currently exceeds most of the 
developing world, and a burgeoning 
· entrepreneurial sector. As such, the 
experiences of Turkish entrepreneurs with 
cooperation versus competition would seem 
to offer valuable lessons for emerging 
companies in both developing and developed 
countries across the globe. 
Scale Development 
In developing appropriate measures, it was 
important to recognize that firms will behave 
uniquely if a relationship contains both 
competition and cooperation at the same 
time. Moreover, as noted earlier, small firms 
differ in a number of significant ways from 
their larger counterparts when it comes to 
establishing relationships with competitors. 
Based on the literature review and an 
assessment of available scales, the twenty-
item scale summarized in Table 1 was 
generated to measure the three proposed 
dimensions of coopetition. 
For the mutual benefit dimension, eight 
items were employed. Three of them (MB 1, 
MB6, and MB7) were based on measures 
developed by Ramaseshan and Loo (1998), 
who report a scale reliability of 0.94. Two 
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measures (MB2 and MB5) were developed 
by Hooley and Fahy (2002), with a reliability 
of 0.92. MB8 was used by Sherer ( 2003), 
while the remaining three items were 
developed by the authors. Six items were 
employed to measure the trust dimension 
(Tl-T6). These were adapted from Sherer 
(2003) and Ramaseshan and Loo (1998), 
who report a reliability score (Cronbach's 
alpha) of 0.94. The commitment dimension 
included six measures (COM1-COM6). 
COM 1 was adapted from Ramaseshan and 
Loo (1998) and Morgan and Hunt (1994); 
COM2 and COM3 were developed by 
Ramaseshan and Loo (1998); COM4 is 
based on items employed by Bucklin and 
Sengupta (1993) and Sherer (2003); COM5 
was adapted from Sherer (2003) and Morgan 
and Hunt (1994 ); COM6 is from scales 
designed by Bucklin and Sengupta (1993). 
Reported reliabilities were 0.89 for 
Ramaseshan and Loo (1998), 0.89 for 
Morgan and Hunt (1994), and 0.84 for 
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993). The items 
measuring the three coopetition dimensions 
employed five-point Likert-type response 
scales (1 = strongly disagree to 5=strongly 
agree). 
Three measures of performance were 
employed: profit, sales growth (volume), and 
competitive position. Given the difficulties 
in obtaining reliable sales and profit figures 
from smaller firms, various researchers have 
focused on reports of relative changes over 
time (e.g., Wijewardena & Tibbits, 1999). 
Hence, respondents were asked to report the 
changes in sales, profits, and competitive 
position over three years using a likert-type 
format. 
In sum, the content validity of the measures 
was established through the adoption of 
validated instruments from previous studies. 
In addition, in-depth interviews with small 
firm owners were conducted to determine 
whether each measure fit the aim of the 
study, resulting in minor changes in the 
instrument prior to the pretest. 
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Table 1 - Items Included in the Coopetition Scale 
We wish tp assess your attitudes toward a situation where your firm collaborates with one of 
your competitors. Please indicate on a five-point scale the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each of the following statements: 
MUTUAL BENEFIT 
MB 1. Even though the partner is my competitor, I would not hesitate to get into the 
relationshio if my competitive oosition would be enhanced. 
MB2. Even though the partner is my competitor, we are open to sharing resources and 
information. 
MB3. Even ifl establish a relationship with a competitor, competition with the partner is 
more imnortant to me. 
MB4. When I have a relationship with a competitor, the relationship is more important than 
comnetiniz. 
MB5. I am willing to get into a relationship only when my partner has resources such as 
eauioment. knowledize and connections, which I do not have. 
MB6. I izet into a relationshio with a competitor only if both comoanies are of similar sizes. 
MB7. I get into a relationship with a competitor only ifthe firm is smaller than my 
company. 
MB8. To establish a relationship with my competitor, both companies must have mutual 
izoals and obiectives. 
TRUST 
Tl. In a relationship, I establish with my competitor, my partner must be honest and 
reliable. 
T2. In a relationship, I establish with my competitor, I must know that my partner will not 
oursue conflictin2 relationshios with other firms. 
T3. Believing that my partner will try to take advantage of my firm will seriously hinder 
the relationshio. 
T4. In a relationship, I establish with my competitor, participants must be willing to share 
internal information. 
T5. In a relationship, I establish with my competitor, internal information must not be used 
for anv other nurooses than for the oartnershio. 
T6. In a relationship, I establish with my competitor, my partner must always be faithful to 
the relationshio. 
COMMITMENT 
COM 1. For the success of a relationship I establish with my competitor, I must be 
comoletelv committed. 
COM2. For the success of a relationship I establish with my competitor, my partner must 
be committed as much as I am. 
COM3. Relationshios I establish with my comnetitor are verv imoortant to my firm. 
COM4. In a relationship I establish with my competitor, the success of the relationship will 
be higher when my partner is willing to arrange his/her firm's operations according to the 
structure of the relationshio. 
COM5. In a relationship I establish with my competitor, both parties must desire to 
strenothen the comnetitive nosition of the oartners. 
COM6. In a relationship I establish with my competitor, I determine my responsibilities 
and commitments accordiniz to the izoals of the relationshio. 
45 
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Data Collection 
Because the items were adapted from 
English language research, and the native 
language of respondents was Turkish, the 
survey items were translated. Also, as 
suggested by Churchill ( 1979), a Turkish 
faculty member was asked to translate the 
Turkish version into English to ensure that 
translation would match the original one and 
not lose meaning. Following this, the 
Turkish version of the questionnaire was pre-
tested with a separate sample of 50 small 
firm owners to detcuuine whether the 
questions expressed the statements clearly. 
Based on the pre-test, minor modifications 
were made to reduce ambiguity. 
The final survey involved a mail survey sent 
to owners of a randomly generated sample of 
1,000 small firms located in Ankara, the 
largest city in Turkey. A government listing 
of all such firms based on organized industry 
areas provided the sampling frame. Firms 
were selected without consideration for the 
sector in which they operate. All businesses 
in the sampling frame had between 5-25 
employees. After elimination of surveys 
having non-useable responses, the sample 
included 647 completed questionnaires, for a 
response rate of 64.7 per cent. No patterns 
were identified among respondent firms in 
terms of industry-type. The high response 
rate likely reflects the limited extent to which 
these firms have been surveyed, the 
involvement of a prestigious university, a 
reliance on follow-up telephone calls, and an 
offer to provide respondents an executive 
summary of the findings. 
Finally, company age was used as a control 
variable in the study, as age has potential 
implications for the firm's approach to 
coopetition and the subsequent impact on 
performance. Older firms may achieve 
higher performance levels because their 
expertise and experience, while younger 
firms may grow rapidly and perform better 
due to new innovative ideas and dynamic 
management (Wijewardena & Tibbits, 
1999). The median age of the sampled firms 
was 9 .4 years, and so the sample was 
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partitioned based on this median split. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Assessing the Coopetition Scale 
The proposed coopet1tlon scale was 
evaluated using a three-step approach. First, 
exploratory factor analysis (EF A) was 
employed for classifying the items to reflect 
the underlying structure of the construct. 
Second, confirmatory factor analysis (CF A) 
was employed to determine the acceptability 
of the data. Finally, the reliability of the 
scales measuring each of the identified 
factors or dimensions was examined. 
Exploratory factor analysis is a useful 
preliminary technique for scale construction, 
and is used to purify items. Before the 
analysis, Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) and 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity were used to 
determine if the correlation matrix is 
appropriate for factoring. A KMO of .92, 
exceeding the .60 level suggested by Gursoy 
and Gavcar (2003), and a Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity with p<.001 together indicate that 
factor reduction by exploratory factor 
analysis can be applied to the data (see Table 
2). 
Principal axis factoring, rather than 
components analysis, was used as a variable 
reduction method. Principal axis analysis 
seeks the least number of factors which can 
account for the common variance of a set of 
variables. Principal component analysis 
should not be used if a researcher wishes to 
obtain parameters reflecting latent constructs 
or factors (Widaman, 1993). Items with a> 
.50 extraction value were eliminated (see 
Table 3). The final results produced an 11-
item scale. In the new scale, mutual benefit 
is represented by three items (MB 1, MB2, 
MB7), trust by three items (Tl, T2, T4) and 
commitment by five items (COM!, COM2, 
COM3, COM4, COM5). 
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Table l - Results for KMO and Bartlett's Test 
'ser-Me er-Olkin Measure of Sam .915 
6538.557 
190 
Si. .000 
Table 3 - Results for Factor Reduction 
Items Extraction 
MBl .825 
MB2 .767 
MB3 .233 
MB4 .417 
MB5 .322 
MB6 .402 
MB7 .686 
MB8 .393 
Tl .696 
T2 .694 
Confinnatory factor analysis using LISREL 
8.2 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1998) was 
performed to assess the unidimensionality of 
the proposed dimensions. The overall chi-
square statistic was (41)=316.08, p=.000. 
However, the analysis was conducted with a 
large sample, and chi-square values will be 
higher as sample size increases (e.g., see 
Kelloway, 1998). Widely used fit indices 
exceeding .90, and .87 when adjusted for 
degrees of freedom (AGFI), indicate an 
adequate fit [Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) 
=.92; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) =.96; 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) =.95; Non-Normed 
Fit Index (NNFI) =.95]. The Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA=.10) was at a level supported by 
Steiger (1990) and the Root Mean square 
Residual (RMR=.03) was lower than the 
recommendedlevelof.05. 
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Items Extraction 
T3 .346 
T4 .712 
T5 .279 
T6 .288 
COMl .668 
COM2 .712 
COM3 .675 
COM4 .373 
COM5 .747 
COM6 .675 
The results of the CF A are summarized in 
Table 4. Items loaded on their respective 
dimensions and all maximum likelihood 
estimates (MLE' s) were >. 70 and highly 
significant (p's<.001) (the lowest t-value was 
26.50 for COM5). Also in Table 4, 
composite reliability coefficients for the 
dimensions, which draw on the standardized 
loadings and measurement error for each 
item, exceeded the recommended level of. 70 
(Shook et al., 2004). The Commitment scale 
had the highest level of reliability (.91). 
Reliabilities for the Trust (.89) and Mutual 
Benefit (.88) scales as well as the total 
composite reliability (.92) of the model were 
acceptable. Reliability was also assessed for 
the measures of performance. A Cronbach 
alpha of .82 indicates that the performance 
scale is internally consistent. 
In the CF A, the dimensions were allowed to 
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intercorrelate freely (Vandenbosch, 1996). 
As shown in Table 5, correlation coefficients 
between Mutual Benefit and Trust and 
between Mutual Benefit and Commitment 
were .51 and .52, respectively. These 
findings support the importance of Mutual 
Benefit, together with Trust and 
Commitment, when considering coopetition 
as a strategy. It is noteworthy that the 
correlation between Trust and Commitment 
(.82) was higher than the correlations among 
the other dimensions. High positive 
correlations (>.72) were also found among 
items representing each of the dimensions. 
Convergent validity refers to the 
homogeneity of the dimensions (Churchill, 
1979). It exists when t-values are larger than 
2.58 and items have standardized loadings 
higher than . 70. Convergent validity can also 
be evaluated by examining the correlations 
among the items capturing each of the 
dimensions. Higher correlations between 
items indicate convergent validity. Inter-item 
correlations for each construct ranging from 
.72 - .84 for items in each construct (see 
Table 5) support convergent validity. 
Discriminant validity occurs when measures 
of a construct are not correlated with 
measures of other constructs. As the 
estimated correlations between constructs 
were not 1.00, discriminant validity is also 
indicated (Jones & Suh, 2000). However, as 
the correlation between Trust and 
Commitment was quite high, combining the 
two dimensions may be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, subsequent results for a model 
combining these dimensions were weaker 
than the original. 
Relating Dimensions of Coopetition to 
Performance 
Next, the model linking dimensions of 
coopetition to Performance was evaluated [D 
0 (24)=69. 78, p=.000: RMSEA=.05; 
RMR=.03; GFI=.98; AGFI=.96; NFI=.99; 
NNFI=.99; CFI=.99). The findings suggest 
that Mutual Benefit and Commitment have a 
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significant, positive effect on Performance. 
The t-value for the Trust dimension was non-
significant (<1.96 for a two-tailed test). 
Elimination of Trust from the model 
produced similar parameter estimates (.30 
for effect of Commitment and .09 for effect 
of Mutual Benefit on Performance). When 
considering individual items, two measures 
of Mutual Benefit (MB2, MB7) and three of 
Commitment (COM!, COM2, and COM6) 
were positively associated with Performance. 
Separately, multi-group analysis was used to 
identify whether the relationships between 
dimensions of coopetition and performance 
differed for younger versus older firms. 
Goodness of fit statistics (X2=932.66, p=.000: 
RMSEA=.26; RMR=.29) suggests that the 
two groups do differ. For younger firms, {X2( 
24)=63.12, p=.000; GFI=.97; AGFI=.94; 
NFI=.98; NNFI=.98; RMSEA=.06; 
RMR=.03), the effects of Mutual Benefit 
( .12) and commitment ( .19) on performance 
were similar to results of the aggregate 
sample. For older firms, (X2(24)=89.03, 
p=.000; RMSEA=.11; RMR=.04; GFI=.92; 
AGFI=.85; NNFI=.94, CFI=0.96) both 
Commitment (.22) and Trust (.30) had 
significant, positive effects on performance. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study has examined coopetition as a 
strategy for small ventures, identifying 
unique challenges when these firms attempt 
to collaborate with competitors. A scale to 
measure the coopetitive tendencies of 
smaller firms has been proposed and 
validated. Following exploratory factor 
analysis, an eleven-item scale representing 
mutual benefit, trust, and commitment was 
produced. Attention has also been devoted to 
establishing the theoretical basis for these 
dimensions together with a description of 
their underlying characteristics. Using a 
large, cross-sectional sample of small 
Turkish ventures, the findings suggest that 
coopetition is not unusual among such firms. 
In addition, while other studies on inter-
organizational relationships have tended to 
emphasize the impact of trust and 
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Table 4- Validity and Reliability of Models 
Dimensions Items MLE 
MBl .95 
Mutual Benefit MB2 .89 
MB7 .87 
Tl .90 
Trust T2 .92 
T4 .89 
COMl .88 
COM2 .90 
Commitment COM3 .87 
COM5 .85 
COM6 .85 
commitment on decisions within 
collaborating firms, the results indicate that 
coopetitive tendencies are associated with all 
three dimensions. Moreover, these 
otherstudies have tended to focus on vertical 
Model2 
Stand. t-values Composite 
Err. reliability 
coefficient 
.03 31.54 
.03 28.71 89.29 
.03 27.59 
.03 29.35 
.03 30.08 87.83 
.03 28.52 
.03 28.34 
.03 29.17 
.03 27.54 90.89 
.03 26.50 
.03 26.62 
relationships between organizations, such as 
in a value-added chain or distribution 
channel, whereas the current research has 
concentrated on horizontal relationships. 
Figure 1 - Results for the Causal Model 
T 
COM 
.03 
(0.31) 
.09 
(2.00) 
.27 
3.27 
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Hence, for small firms, partnerships with 
competitors are indeed predicated on mutual 
benefit, trust, and commitment. The findings 
for commitment and trust are consistent with 
the work of Morgan and Hunt (1994) who 
emphasize the roles of commitment and trust 
in mediating successful business 
relationships not involving competitors. 
However, mutual benefit also becomes 
critical when working with a competitor, and 
particularly, benefits related to the resources 
and information the firms will acquire and 
the market positions the firms will assume. 
With regard to the trust dimension, small 
firms are more likely to partner with 
competitors perceived to be honest and 
reliable. Other key aspects of trust include 
the sense that partners will be loyal to the 
relationship, and not arbitrarily leave for 
alternative relationships, and they will 
consistently honor their commitments. 
Further, trust is strongly influenced by 
openness in information sharing. 
For the commitment dimension, the central 
concern appears to be the perception that the 
other party is dedicated to strengthening not 
only their own pos1t1on, but the 
relationship's position in the marketplace. 
Hence, commitment is to the success of the 
dyad, and so, to the achievement of market 
advantage by the other party. Similarly, each 
party has a sense of obligation and 
responsibility for goals and activities that 
contribute to relationship outcomes as 
opposed to organizational outcomes alone. 
Yet, trust and commitment must also be 
coupled with a clear sense that both parties 
actually benefit from the relationship. While 
under-emphasized as a unique dimension in 
other research, mutual benefits obviously can 
take many forms. The current research 
suggests that small firms are especially 
concerned with obtaining resources 
otherwise unavailable to them, including key 
forms of information that can serve to 
enhance their market performance. The 
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perception of mutual benefit appears to be 
greater when the prospective partner is 
smaller in size that the entrepreneur's firm. 
The findings also indicate that the three 
dimensions are significantly correlated with 
each other. While trust and commitment 
demonstrated higher inter-correlations, both 
were positively associated with mutual 
benefit. It may well be that trust and 
commitment are more dependent upon one 
another. At the same time, it would seem that 
mutual benefit can occur even absent high 
levels of trust or commitment, while actual 
levels of benefit realized are subject to 
uncontrollable influences even where trust 
and commitment are high. 
Importantly, where evaluations on these 
dimensions are higher, firms appear to 
perform better. The proclivity to pursue 
coopetition, when measured in the proposed 
manner, is associated with enhanced 
financial performance. This might suggest 
coopetition is not so much an action of 
necessity as it is a coherent strategy for 
mitigating risk and leveraging resources. 
That is, although working with one's 
competitor entails some level of risk, it 
would seem that coopetition is actually a risk 
management strategy for the small firm. By 
relying on the intelligence, experience, 
human resources, and networks of suppliers, 
distributors and customers of a competitor, 
the entrepreneur is mitigating the firm's 
fixed cost investment, lessening learning 
costs, and exposing the firm to less trial and 
error. The entrepreneur is doing so at a time 
when the firm is especially vulnerable to the 
impact of inappropriate managerial 
decisions. It is noteworthy, though, that trust 
was not a driver of performance, while 
commitment and mutual benefit were. This 
fmding may be due to the tangible gains 
associated with higher levels of commitment 
and greater mutual benefit. By itself, 
trusting a competitor is not enough to effect 
company performance. Firm age is also an 
explanatory factor in these findings. Mutual 
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benefit is a more significant factor in the 
performance of younger firms, while trust 
explains performance in older firms. It may 
be that trust talces longer to establish, and 
younger firms pursue coopetition when 
relationships of trust have yet to fully 
develop. An alternative explanation is that 
older firms may be more wary, based on 
experience, of the tendency of other firms to 
act solely based on self-interest and to 
achieve short-term advantage---leading them 
to place greater primacy on trust, and 
resulting in less impact on performance in 
the absence of trust. 
The study also provides a platform from 
which a number of directions for future 
research can be identified. There is a need 
for more industry-specific research, in that 
the performance implications of coopetition 
may well vary depending on the cost 
structures, competitive intensity, technology 
?ase, and related conditions within a given 
mdustry. A host of firm-level variables also 
require investigation in a small venture 
context. Overall firm objectives (e.g., growth 
aspirations, rates of return sought), and 
company strategy (e.g., basis for 
differentiation, positioning strategy, 
transactional versus relational approach to 
customers) would seem especially relevant in 
this regard. Also important would be firm 
competencies, levels of resource slack by 
resource category, and fmancial structure 
among others. In addition, attention should 
be devoted to inter-firm dynamics when 
smaller companies collaborate with their 
competitors. From a dyadic perspective, the 
implications of differences in the relative 
power positions, company ages, historical 
performance levels, customer base, and 
social and communication-related skills of 
the partnering firms might hold important 
implications for the impact of coopetitive 
strategies. Finally, the proposed scale was 
specifically developed for application within 
small firms, and was applied to Turkish 
firms. As such, further work is needed to 
ascertain its applicability to once firms 
achieve certain size thresholds, and in other 
52 
Vol. 18, No. 1Spring/Summer2007 
country contexts. Movement forward on 
these and related questions will hopefully be 
facilitated by the scale development and 
testing work presented here. 
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